Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons' by Sandis, Constantine
142
6
Hume and the Debate on 
‘Motivating Reasons’
Constantine Sandis*
It is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two 
disputed views but in some third possibility which has not 
yet been thought of, which we can only discover by rejecting 
something assumed as obvious by both  disputants.
(Ramsey, 1931, pp. 115–6)
Introduction
This essay offers a new interpretation of Hume’s account of motivation 
before relating it to certain disputes in modern moral psychology. The essay 
is divided into three parts. First, I lay down some general distinctions in the 
 so- called theory of motivation (TOM), introducing two related but distinct 
ongoing debates. Next, in the middle and largest parts of the essay, I focus on 
what Hume has to say on these matters, concluding that the standard map 
of available positions leaves no space for his view, as it rejects an assumption 
shared by all concerned. Finally, I demonstrate how the disputes most central 
to the debates we began with evaporate once we follow Hume in rejecting this 
shared assumption, taking this to count in his favour.
6.1 The motivational map
The term ‘motivation’ is most widely used to refer to either:
(a) Whatever it is that motivates us (often misleadingly termed our ‘motives’ 
or ‘motivators’).
 or
(b) Our being motivated (by (a)).
Accordingly, TOM is, at least prima facie, a central part of what used to be 
called ‘philosophical psychology’ whose principle focus is the provision of 
 a satisfactory account of (b) in terms of (a). While this project is more closely 
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tied to moral psychology than to the philosophy of cognitive science which 
currently passes as ‘philosophy of psychology’ it is not concerned with the 
normative question of what ought to motivate us to act, but only with what 
possibly could and/or actually does.
There are numerous debates within TOM but I shall here restrict myself 
to just two, both concerning the nature of (a). The first of these is between 
Humeanism and  Anti- Humeanism (cf. Smith, 1994), the second between 
what has been called Psychologism and  Non- Psychologism (cf. Dancy, 
2000). What I shall argue will, for the most part, be of mere passing interest 
to the causalism/anti-causalism controversy and the disputes between vari-
ous forms of internalism and externalism. The definitions that follow are 
fairly standard:
Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting that 
are constituted by our desires and beliefs. Proponents include Mele 
(1992), Smith (1994) and Lenman (1996).
 Anti- Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting 
that need only be constituted by beliefs. For example Nagel (1970), 
Foot (1972b), McDowell (1978 &1979) and McNaughton (1988).
Pure  Anti- Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for 
acting that are constituted purely by beliefs. Proponents include Parfit 
(1997) and Dancy (1993 & 2000).
Psychologism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting 
that are psychologically real, and therefore, of an entirely different 
ontological category to normative reasons which are conceived of 
as truths, facts, states of affairs, or propositions. Proponents include 
Nagel (1970), and Mele (1992), Smith (1994) and Brink (1997).
 Non- Psychologism: We are motivated by reasons for acting that are not 
psychologically real but, rather, of the same ontological category as nor-
mative reasons. Proponents include Dancy (1995 & 2000) and Collins 
(1997); hints of this view may also be found in Williams (1980) and 
Nagel (1997). The  non- psychologism about normative reasons plugged 
into this view is defended by Broome (1997), Raz (1986), Scanlon 
(1999), Dancy (2000) and Quinn (1993).
Throughout these disagreements all disputants share a common assump-
tion, namely the view that the things that motivate us are (at times by 
definition) reasons for which we act. Hence TOM is thought to be a theory 
of motivating reasons for action. We might characterise this assumption as 
follows:
The Common View (CV): TOM is a theory about the reasons we act for.
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144  Hume and the Debate on ‘Motivating Reasons’
I shall eventually conclude that Hume cannot partake in either of the two 
aforementioned debates within TOM precisely because he rejects CV. Still 
I begin by trying to place him there.
6.2 Hume on reason and influence
If Hume is to at all resemble a Humean, he will insist that desires are a con-
stitutive part of what motivates us. Belief alone, so the official Humean line 
goes, is inert. Here are the passages most commonly quoted in defence of 
this understanding of Hume (pace most modern interpreters Hume only ever 
capitalises the word ‘reason’ when it starts a new sentence):
[R]eason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will (T, 2.3.3.1/413); 
Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our 
actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects 
(T, 2.3.3.2/414); impulse arises not from reason but is only directed by it 
(T, 2.3.3.3/414); reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise 
to volition … the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition (T, 
2.3.3.4/414 5); reason has no influence on our passions (T, 3.1.1.7/457); 
I have prov’d, that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent 
or produce any action of affection (T, 3.1.1.8/458); Reason is wholly inac-
tive (T, 3.1.1.10/458); The action may cause a judgment, or may be obliquely 
caused by one, when the judgment concurs with a passion (T, 3.1.1.11/459).
There is much tension between these varied formulations of the first premise 
of his Influence Argument which seem to range from the claim that reason 
is wholly inactive to the suggestion that it can (albeit obliquely) cause 
action. Critics are divided over the issue of whether or not Hume is contra-
dicting himself (cf. Botros, 2006, Chapter 1 for various exegetical positions, 
including her own arguments in favour of the ‘contradiction’ view; in what 
follows I shall retain neutrality here by keeping the term ‘alone’ in brackets). 
They all agree, however, that by ‘reason’ Hume means the same thing as 
‘belief’ or ‘judgment’ (cf. Mackie, 1980, p. 53 for a typical example of this 
near-universal assumption). Yet how true is this? Beliefs, for Hume, are lively 
ideas, which in turn are copies of impressions:
An opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv’d from 
a present impression related to it.
(T, 1.3.8.16/119; cf. T, 1.1.1.1/1–2)
Accordingly, in the section ‘Of the Influence of Belief’ Hume assigns the 
same effects to them, abeit in a lesser degree:
[T]he ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be exist-
ent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, 
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which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, 
then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impres-
sions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions.
(T, 1.3.10.3/119)
The context makes it clear that by ‘like influence’ Hume means ‘brings about 
the same effect to a lesser degree’, the degree in question being proportion-
ate to the degree to which the idea in question is fainter to the impression it 
is a copy of, beliefs being the most lively of all ideas. Moreover, while Hume 
contrasts reason with sentiment (for example in EPM, 1.3/134) he clearly 
identifies belief with a kind of sentiment:
Belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling … or sentiment. … ’Tis felt rather 
than conceived, and approaches the impression, from which it is deriv’d, 
in its force and influence … it is something felt by the mind which distin-
guishes the ideas of judgments from the ideas of the imagination … and 
renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
(T, App. 3/624; cf. Korsgaard, 1997a, p. 24)
There is nothing  non- cognitivist in this construal of belief. On the 
 contrary, Hume clearly states that beliefs are capable of being true or 
false (T, 3.1.1.12/459, quoted further below). More importantly, we have 
not yet seen anything which suggests that Hume thought that no belief could 
motivate, whether alone or otherwise. Indeed, I shall later be claiming 
that this is precisely what Hume takes moral beliefs to be capable of doing.
Hume’s claim that reason cannot motivate (alone), it would begin to 
appear, cannot be as straightforward as the thesis that beliefs cannot moti-
vate, let alone the Humean variety which specifies desires or pro-attitudes 
of some related kind as the missing ingredient (cf. Snare 1991:55). We might 
therefore do better to understand it as the (sometimes doubly) qualified 
claim that (only) those beliefs derived from reason (alone) cannot motivate 
(alone). So understood, it states that there is a subset of beliefs – viz. those 
derived from reason (alone) – whose motivational power is at best con-
strained and at worst nil.
Yet even this interpretation may be restricting the role of belief further than 
Hume intended, for two related reasons. The first is that it remains neutral 
on the issue of whether Hume takes all action to be produced by passions, or 
whether he allows that, at least sometimes, beliefs may be said to move us to 
action by exciting a passion that is not derived from reason (alone). In the lat-
ter kind of case, desires need not be anything more than enablers of action (cf. 
Dancy 2000:127ff.). We should, after all, take care not to conflate the claim 
that we cannot only be moved to act unless we already have certain passions 
with the claim that the passions in question are always part of our motivation. 
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Plato’s Socrates warns against the basic fallacy that such a conflation would 
involve:
τὸ γὰρ µὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο µέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ 
οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον   
(Phaedo, 99b, translated by R. Hackforth as ‘fancy not being able  to 
 distinguish between the cause of a thing and that without which the 
cause would not be a cause!’ and by D. Gallop as ‘fancy being unable 
to distinguish between two things: the reason proper and that without 
which the reason could never be a reason!’; cf. Dancy 2004: 45)
Is Hume guilty of such a fallacy? The answer partly depends on how we 
disambiguate his phrase ‘concurs with a passion’. A clue is offered in the 
following passage:
[T]he impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. ’Tis from 
the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises 
towards any object.
(T, 2.3.3.3/414)
The impulse in question may not arise from reason yet this does not pre-
clude the idea that once it is there, reason may move us to take various 
means as ways of satisfying it. Korsgaard describes such cases as ones where 
Hume makes it clear that ‘we can be moved by a judgement about a prob-
able passion’ (Korsgaard 2009: 64, n.6). To this extent, even beliefs derived 
from reason alone may be said to motivate us (alone), though Hume would 
not himself have put it this way, not least because he takes this to be a case 
of directing action rather than producing it, which renders the causation in 
question oblique.
This brings us to the second reason for being cautious in our interpreta-
tion which is that Hume does not employ modern psychological terms such 
as ‘motivation’, ‘motivating’ and ‘motivate(s)’. He only talks of ‘motives’ 
which he introduces as things that ‘produce’ or ‘influence’ action. The moti-
vation of action, however, is a different phenomenon from its production (cf. 
Sandis, 2008a). Indeed, we are frequently motivated to perform actions that 
never take place. Strictly speaking, then, Hume’s view is closer to the claim 
that only beliefs derived from reason (alone) cannot (alone) produce an 
action, a thesis which is relatively weak given his presumption that actions 
may be caused by anything which regularly precedes them so long as it is 
true that ‘if the first object had not been, the second never had existed’ 
(EHU, 8.2.4/76; cf. T, 1.3.14.21/166).
So what is it for a belief to be derived from reason (alone)? To answer this 
we must return to our initial question which was ‘what does Hume mean by 
“reason?”’ Here is what ‘Hume’s Fork’ tells us:
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Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists 
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to 
real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible 
of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and 
can never be an object of our reason.
(T, 3.1.1.9/458; cf. T, 2.3.2/413)
So portrayed, reason is concerned with beliefs and not desires. Hume rejects 
the Aristotelian account of emotion as a cognitive phenomenon, hence 
his claim that ‘passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are 
accompany’d with some judgment or opinion’ which swiftly leads him 
to the infamous remark about it not being contrary to reason ‘to prefer 
the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger’ (T, 
2.3.3.6./416). Yet this is not to say that the objects of reason (i.e. beliefs) are 
inert but only that a subset of them, viz. those beliefs that are themselves 
reached through reason (alone), do not influence action (alone).
In sum, beliefs for Hume are all sentiments, some of which are derived from 
reason alone and some from reason combined with some other sentiment(s). 
This helps to explain those instances of the doubly qualified claim that it is 
only beliefs derived from reason alone that cannot influence alone. Mutatis 
mutandis, it could also account for the reasoning of Influence Argument:
Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself 
is utterly impotent in this matter. The rules of morality therefore, are not 
conclusions of our reason.
(T, 3.1.1.6/457, my emphasis; cf. EPM, 1.5–9/135–7)
This passage is standardly interpreted as an argument for moral 
 non- cognitivism, the form of  non- cognitivism usually attributed to Hume 
being one which asserts that moral judgements are expressions of our desires 
(cf. Blackburn 1996, p. 180). On such readings, the conclusion of the argu-
ment is meant to be that moral judgements are not beliefs but, rather, expres-
sions of desire. We have already seen, however, that Hume allows that beliefs 
can can excite passions and actions (alone or otherwise). It would make no 
sense for Hume to consequently suggest that since moral judgements can 
influence the passions on their own they cannot be cognitive (i.e. beliefs). 
I propose, instead, to reconstruct the Influence Argument as follows:
(P1) Moral beliefs produce action (alone).
(P2) Beliefs that are conclusions of reason (alone) do not produce 
action (alone).
(C) Moral beliefs are not derived from reason (alone).
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So conceived, the argument aims only to show that since (P1) moral judge-
ments can move us (alone) and (P2) beliefs derived from reason (alone) can-
not produce action (alone) we should conclude that (C) moral judgements 
are not derived from reason (alone), whatever that turns out to mean. But 
why should this amount to anything more than the claim that it ‘is in 
vain to pretend, that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason’? 
(T, 3.1.1.7/457) since ‘reason … can never be the source of so active a prin-
ciple as conscience, or a sense of morals’ (T, 3.1.1.10/458)? There is nothing 
 non- cognitivist in these remarks. As Francis Snare (1991: Ch. 2) has pointed 
out it could, for example, be read as an  anti- realist remark and indeed – for 
all he has said so far – Hume may even be some kind of intuitionist real-
ist (Snare ultimately interprets  Hume as a non-cognitivist but rejects the 
notion that this position is conclusively established by any formulation of 
the Influence Argument).
In his splendid book, Snare also notes that – though valid (and possibly 
also true) – this syllogism is  question- begging. He offers the following ‘senti-
mental zoology’ by analogy, noting that ‘if we substitute “whale” for “trout” 
in the parody we get a valid argument with true premises and conclusion, 
but an argument just as question-begging’ (1991, p. 51):
(P1*) No sort of fish interests me.
(P2*) Trout do interest me.
(C*) Trout are not fish.
Unless (P1*) is an a priori truth, we cannot dismiss the possibility that (P2*) 
is not a  counter- example to it. The same logic holds for the preceding syl-
logism regarding moral beliefs (above) and yet (P1) appears to be an empiri-
cal proposition. In fact so does (P2), but if Hume is to reach the conclusion 
that no moral belief can be cognitive (as opposed to the considerably weaker 
thesis that all the moral beliefs he happens to have observed – or, at best, 
that we all happen to have had so far – are non-cognitive) (P2) must be a nec-
essary truth. This would only be plausible if we could somehow conceive 
of it as a logical remark concerning the limits of reason (perhaps resulting 
from the narrow scope that Hume restricts it to) rather than as a statement 
regarding the observed motivational inertness of belief. Either way, there are 
independent reasons for thinking that the Influence Argument is compat-
ible with cognitivist internalism concerning the relation of moral judgements 
to the production of action (of which (P1) could even be a weak statement 
of), It is to these that I now turn.
Beliefs for Hume, we have already seen, are ‘felt sentiments’, so it 
would be prudent to read the Influence Argument in the light of this 
general ‘sentimentalism’. On this picture to have a belief is not to merely 
assent to a proposition but to feel that it is true (cf. Owen, 2003). Eo ipso, 
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to have a moral belief would be to feel that something is morally right or 
wrong. This strengthens the case for an internalist reading of (P1), and 
could possibly explain why Hume may have taken (P1) to be a universal 
truth of some kind. Given that Hume’s sentimentalism does not lead him 
to a non-cognitivist characterisation of beliefs in general, there is no rea-
son to suppose he takes morality to be any different when he claims that 
it ‘is more properly felt than judg’d of’ (T 3.1.2/470) and that ‘to have 
a sense of virtue is nothing but to feel satisfaction of a particular kind’ 
(T 3.1.2/471). Vice and virtue are discoverable ‘by means of some impres-
sion or sentiment they occasion’ (T 3.1.2/470), but this is not to say that 
the resulting beliefs are impressions. And even if they were, their effects 
would be no different in kind to those of ideas, besides which our moral 
feelings are said to be ‘so soft and gentle’ that we are ‘apt to confound’ 
them with ideas (T 3.1.2/470), which only differ from impressions in 
their vivacity).
If not the lack of a  non- cognitive component, then what is it that makes 
beliefs derived from reason (alone), inert? The obvious candidate would be 
the actual cause or origin of the judgements. But what exactly is it about 
their origin that makes the beliefs in question inert? It cannot simply be that 
reason itself just happens to be inert since this would be clearly at odds with 
Hume’s more general views regarding causation (which, incidentally, is in 
tension with the Humean theory of motivation in general:
[A]ny thing may produce any thing. … Creation, annihilation, motion, 
reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other 
object we can imagine … the constant conjunction of objects determines their 
causation … ’tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each 
other.
(T, 1.3.15.1–2/173, emphasis in the original)
Jonathan Dancy, who voices a similar concern (1993, p. 15), qualifies it by 
noting that this point is not so strong since there are many inconsistencies 
in Hume. Be that as it may, the name of the game is to offer the most consist-
ent interpretation possible, and nothing in Hume’s argument so far suggests 
that actions do not (let alone cannot) follow beliefs with appropriate regu-
larity, this being all that Hume’s notion of causation appears to require (cf. 
T 2.3.1/403ff, Korsgaard 2009:64, & Sandis 2010a and 2010b). Indeed as far 
as the Treatise is concerned we can assign Hume the view that the inertness 
in question is attributable to a further fact about judgements derived from 
reason (alone), namely that their intentional objects are limited to the two 
alternatives provided by his fork (see p. 147 above). In his later Dissertation 
on the Passions (5.1-2/161ff.) Hume explicitly distinguishes between a strict 
and a popular sense of ‘reason’ with the aim of equating the former with the 
judgement of truth and falsehood (which can only  influence to the degree 
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that they touch some passion or affection) and the latter with the aforemen-
tioned ‘calm’ passion (which ‘actuates the will’).
6.3 Hume’s error theories of reasons
Any judgement derived from reason alone, can only pertain to the kind of 
relations described in the fork. These relations, Hume states, tell us  nothing 
about how we ought to act and are consequently incapable of moving us on 
their own. There is an obvious analogy here with Hume’s remarks concern-
ing the powers of theoretical reason (for example T, 1.3.6/16) which aim 
to show that we cannot infer from any relation discovered by reason that 
the future will resemble the past. Judgements about these relations cannot 
(alone) cause us to make the transition from an impression of constant 
conjunction to the idea of necessary connection, anymore than they can 
produce action. Rather we are determined to do so ‘by a certain association 
and relation of perceptions’ (T 1.3/88-9); no ‘ought’ is derived from reason 
(alone).
To recap: if we have no reason to form a certain belief and/or be moved 
to action in a certain way, then our beliefs and actions cannot be the result 
of a judgement derived from reason (alone). In each case there is a missing 
principle which reason (alone)  cannot  provide. In the theoretical case,  reason 
cannot provide us a principle that would confirm that the future must 
necessarily continue to resemble the past. This is why Hume attributes our 
belief to custom, though he arguably takes it to be in with ‘reason’ in the 
popular sense given above. In the practical case, Hume’s reason cannot tell 
us whether or not we ought to satisfy our desires, it can only tell us how to 
go about doing so. Given the absence of a suitable impression, Hume would 
have arguably claimed that we cannot have a meaningful idea of a norma-
tive reason insofar as this is thought to amount to anything more than a 
description of our natural propensities and aversions (see further below). 
But we might also call him a nihilist with regard to the practicality of pure 
reason: no consideration derived from reason (alone) could (alone) count in 
favour of an action.
Indeed, Christine Korsgaard (1986 & 1997a), Elijah Millgram (1995) and 
Jean Hampton (1995) have all suggested, for a diversity of reasons too 
complicated to repeat here, on Hume’s view the hypothetical imperatives 
generated by  means- end reasoning cannot even provide us with instru-
mental reasons (consequently Hume either never generates imperatives, 
or does so as a kind of proto-Kantian or empirical revisionist (see further 
below).
On such understandings of the ‘reason is, and ought only to be the slave 
of the passions’ passage (T, 2.3.3.4./415), reason ought to be a slave of the 
passions in the sense that it can only tell you what you should do in order 
to satisfy your desires. Whether or not you ought to satisfy them it cannot 
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comment on. Practical reasoning thus reduces to means-end reasoning. 
The alternative, more common, interpretation of Hume is he takes desire 
to command in the sense of it (alone) being able to tell us what we have 
reason to do, namely whatever will satisfy them (but see Schroeder 2007 
for a more subtle version of the Humeanism theory of reasons). Yet if this 
interpretation is correct, not only would Hume be making a logical fallacy 
which he seems to have been sensitive to (that of detaching an ought from 
the conjunction it applied to in one of the premises and applying it to just 
one of the conjuncts in the conclusion), he would also be breaking his own 
law (that you cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’).
Let us call the view that practical reason cannot transcend the means-
end relation Hume’s error theory of normative reasons. This theory maintains 
that no judgement or desire (or combination of both) could ever tell us 
(unconditionally) how we ought to act (cf. Mackie, 1977, pp. 18 and 35). 
It entails that when beliefs produce action, they do not do so by giving 
us (what we take to be) a good reason for acting. One’s taking something 
to be a good reason could, of course, have the appropriate influence. The 
thesis merely states is that the (normative) judgement that X is a good 
reason for action cannot be derived from reason (alone). Consequently, 
no judgement can move us to action purely qua any  reason- giving capac-
ity it might have because such capacities are an illusion. This leads to 
what we might call Hume’s error theory of motivating reasons: our actions 
are never produced by reasons, for there are no such reasons around: 
influencing reasons do not exist, only influencing sentiments (which may 
include one’s taking something to be a reason).
One might object here that moral on this view moral judgements can-
not give us any reason to act either, Hume should not allow that they can 
 influence action any more than judgements derived from reason (alone) can. 
Moral judgements are practical in their concern: they are judgements about 
how we ought to act. Hume takes them to be capable of moving us (alone) 
precisely because they are concerned with ends rather than with means.
As anticipated above, neither error theory prevents Hume from subse-
quently  redefining normative reasons in a strongly naturalised light accord-
ing to which passions might be thought to be defective if they fail to conform 
to some norm or standard of nature. We might even be said to not be as we 
‘should’ be, so long as this means no more than that we do not function in 
a standard fashion and thereby fall short of what happens to be the natural 
norm. Indeed Hume arguably constructs such an account of naturalistic ‘reasons’ 
for acting in (T, 3.1.2–3.2–2/468–84) (cf. Baier 2009 & Sandis 2010a), having 
first tested this revisionist tack in his account of necessary  connexions:
Necessity then is the effect of this observation and is nothing but an 
internal impression of the mind.
(T, 1.3.4.18/165)
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It is the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of 
the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity.
(T, 1.3.4.30/171)
He thus becomes a realist about naturalised reasons (for various refer-
ences to such entities in both his philosophical and his historical work 
see Baier, 2008), as he is regarding necessity. In both cases, it is not 
reason that produces our judgements but human nature, in virtue of all 
the sentiments, habits, instincts, and other dispositions it bestows on us 
(phenomena upon which Hume will ultimately ground his virtue and 
consequentialist normative ethics (in a move later mimicked by Mackie 
and Hare).
6.4 The motivational map revisited
Returning to the map introduced in 6.1, Hume most closely resembles the 
weak  anti- Humean since he allows that at least some beliefs can do the 
motivating ‘on their own’. As for the psychologism/ non- psychologism 
debate, although at times he appears like a psychologist it is difficult to 
know just what to say about him since it is far from obvious that he makes 
a  state- content  distinction. What is obvious however is that in denying that 
influencing reasons (under a certain conception) exist, he rejects CV (the 
view that TOM is a theory about the reasons we act for).
Interestingly, both the psychologism/ non- psychologism and the Humean/ 
anti- Humean debates arise (largely) because of CV.  Non- psychologism takes 
its cue from two truisms: that it is possible to act for a normative reason (viz, 
a reason that counts in favour of an action), and that normative reasons are 
 non- psychologistic. From this it infers that what moves us to action cannot be 
a psychological state (or, for that matter, any other feature of our psychology). 
Psychologism takes its cue from two different truisms: that we are – at least some-
times – motivated by psychological states and that motivation is causal notion 
(which is not to say that it need treat action explanation as being causal).
Psychologism and  non- psychologism both appeal in ways that make one 
feel foolish not to accept them. If we reject  non- psychologism we are faced 
with two horns of a dilemma: either we cannot ever act for good reasons 
or the good reasons we act for are (necessarily) psychological  phenomena. 
Conversely, if we reject psychologism we are left with an account that claims 
that (it is necessarily true that) we are never motivated by either our beliefs 
or our desires, or indeed the two combined together. What counts in favour 
of the former view is precisely what counts against the latter, and vice versa. 
The trouble, then, is that each of the two positions have irresistible selling 
points () which we cannot buy into without also committing ourselves to 
accepting an unwanted consequence (–) of having adopted the position in 
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question. In rejecting either unwanted consequence (as each rival view does) 
we find ourselves having to deny the obvious.
Claims counting for () Claims counting against ()
Psychologism T: We are (at least some-
times) motivated by our 
psychological states.
F: Good reasons (we act for) are not 
psychologically real.
Non-psychologism T: Good reasons (we act 
for) are not psychologi-
cally real.
F: We are (at least sometimes) moti-
vated by our psychological states.
This is problematic because it is natural to side with psychologism with regard 
to motivation and  non- psychologism as far as normative reasons are concerned. 
The motivational map, being drawn by the assumption that we are motivated 
by the reasons for which we act, has no theoretical space for such a position. By 
contrast Hume, having rejected CV, is free to do just this.
Be that as it may, Hume nonetheless seems committed to the thought 
that any successful explanation of action will lie within TOM. That is to say, 
he thinks of action explanation as  motive- giving explanation. Moreover, he 
understands this as a species of causal explanation, introducing the ‘influ-
encing motives of the will’ as the particular causes of actions (T, 2.3.2.8/412 
and 2.3.3/413 ff.). So his view on action causation is one and the same with 
his view on the motives of action.
If we reject Hume’s causalism, however, we are free to side with psycholo-
gists on motivation, and  non- psychologists on reasons for action. A similar 
conclusion might be reached regarding the Humeanism/ anti- Humeanism 
debate, as illustrated:
Claims counting for () Claims counting against ()
Humeanism T: We are (at least sometimes) 
partly motivated by desires.
F: Desires are not parts of 
reasons we act for.
Anti-Humeanism T: Desires are not parts of the 
reasons we act for.
F: We are (at least sometimes) 
partly motivated by desires.
To paraphrase House M.D.: they’re both right, in the sense that they’ve 
 convinced me that they’re both wrong.
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